Emotions and the problem of variability by Loaiza, Juan R.
Emotions and the Problem of Variability
Juan R. Loaiza1,2
# The Author(s) 2020
Abstract
In the last decades there has been a great controversy about the scientific status of
emotion categories. This controversy stems from the idea that emotions are heteroge-
neous phenomena, which precludes classifying them under a common kind. In this
article, I analyze this claim—which I call the Variability Thesis—and argue that as it
stands, it is problematically underdefined. To show this, I examine a recent formulation
of the thesis as offered by Scarantino (2015). On one hand, I raise some issues
regarding the logical structure of the claim. On the other hand, and most importantly,
I show that the Variability Thesis requires a consensus about what counts as a relevant
pattern of response in different domains, a consensus that is lacking in the current
literature. This makes it difficult to assess what counts as evidence for or against this
thesis. As a result, arguments based on the Variability Thesis are unwarranted. This
raises serious concerns about some current empirical theories of emotions, but also
sheds light on the issue of the scientific status of emotion categories.
Since Griffiths’s (1997) What Emotions Really Are, there has been a wide discussion
about the natural kind status of emotions. Broadly construed, the question is whether
emotions (both «emotion» as a general category, as well as particular emotion catego-
ries such as «happiness», «sadness», «fear», and the like) refer to phenomena that can
be distinguished independently of our own conceptual framework, presumably in terms
of affect programs or at least some discrete pattern at the neural or physiological levels.
In more recent years, the focus of this discussion has shifted towards newer empirical
evidence challenging a positive answer to this question. Reviews such as Barrett (2006)
and meta-analyses such as Lindquist et al. (2012) have attempted to show that emotions
are variable phenomena at the neural and physiological levels. This is taken to imply
that emotions do not form natural kinds, and therefore that we should reexamine the
ways in which we think about emotions scientifically.
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The claim that emotions are variable phenomena has appeared in the literature with
many names. Scarantino (2015) calls it the Problem of Variability. Prinz (2004) calls it
the Disunity Thesis. Under any of these names, this claim is one of the main issues of
debate in emotion research. Based on this claim (hereafter the Variability Thesis, or
VT), researchers have argued for rejecting traditional theories of emotion such as basic
emotion theory or discrete appraisal theories (Barrett 2006), defended skepticism about
important past empirical findings (LeDoux 2012), and used it as a platform to construct
new theories of emotion (Barrett 2017; Scarantino 2015).
In this paper, I will claim that even though VT has raised important questions and
issues for emotion theories, this thesis remains underdefined. As a result, drawing
conclusions and basing new theories on VT is problematic, since it is unclear on which
empirical findings and under which criteria is the thesis established. This raises serious
concerns about some current empirical theories of emotions, but also sheds light on the
issue of the natural kind status of emotions and their role in scientific inquiry.
In the first section, I examine the role VT has played in recent discussions about
emotions. Following Scarantino’s (2015; Scarantino and Griffiths 2011) analysis of
VT, I focus on two important consequences drawn from VT in this version. The first is
the claim that “variability is the norm”, a claim that underlies Barrett’s (2017) Theory
of Constructed Emotion. The second is a skeptical thesis about the usefulness of folk
emotion categories in science, one that has been defended by Scarantino (2012b) and
LeDoux (2012). After establishing the importance of VT, in the next section I show
why the thesis, as it has been defined in the literature, leads to ambiguity. I show that
we can divide VT into several sub-theses, each leading to different theoretical com-
mitments and empirical predictions. I further argue that this ambiguity leads to a lack of
consensus regarding what kind of evidence would decide for or against VT, creating an
obstacle for comparing different theories of emotions and their empirical predictions.
1 The Variability Thesis
The Variability Thesis (VT), as presented above, can be presented under the following
working definition:
Variability Thesis (VT): Emotions are naturally disjoined phenomena.
As Scarantino (2015) and others (Barrett 2006; Prinz 2004) formulate it, it is a thesis
directed at basic emotion theory (BET), given that BET (in at least some of its
incarnations) expects that emotions—or at least the basic emotions1—correspond to
discrete neural or physiological patterns. However, this problem is not exclusive to
basic emotion theories (Barrett 2006), but rather affects any theory of emotion that
expects one-to-one mappings between emotions and some presumed natural.
1 Ekman thinks that all emotions are basic, thus expecting all emotions to correspond to some pattern, in this
case a physiological one. Others such as Izard or Panksepp accept distinctions between basic and non-basic
emotions, but identify basic emotions with processes generated by evolutionarily ancient brain systems. (See
Ekman 1992; Ekman and Cordaro 2011; Izard 2007, 2009; Panksepp 1998, 2008, 2011; Panksepp and Watt
2011)
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Scarantino presents VT (the “Problem of Variability” in his terminology) as the
conjunction of two theses:
No One-to-One Correspondence (NOC) Thesis. There is no one-to-one corre-
spondence between anger, fear, happiness, sadness, and so forth, and any neuro-
biological, physiological, expressive, behavioral, or phenomenological responses.
Low Coordination (LC) Thesis. There is low coordination between neurobiolog-
ical, physiological, expressive, behavioral, or phenomenological responses
among instances of anger, fear, happiness, sadness, and so forth. (Scarantino
2015, p. 343)
NOC claims that emotions do not map one-to-one onto processes in the brain or the
body, nor to expressions, behavior, or phenomenology. There are two ways in which
this can occur. One is that for one given emotion category, there are several associated
neural, physiological, expressive, behavioral, or phenomenological responses. The
second is that one set of responses is associated with two emotions. I will consider
these options in detail when I propose some refinements to this claim below.
The LC thesis, on the other hand, holds that there are no robust correlations between
different presumed components of an emotion. In an earlier presentation of this claim,
Scarantino and Griffiths (2011) explain:
Evidence for LC consists of examples of anger, happiness, sadness, surprise,
etcetera, that are instantiated in the absence of a coordinated package of physi-
ological, neurobiological, expressive, behavioral, cognitive, and experiential re-
sponses. (Scarantino and Griffiths 2011, p. 448).
In this formulation, evidence for LC consists of cases in which one given emotion
occurs but there is no set of correlated properties occurring. Barrett (2006), presenting
some evidence for this claim, writes:
Although no single study of emotion has simultaneously measured facial move-
ments, vocal signals, changes in peripheral physiology, voluntary action, and
subjective experience, many studies have measured at least two or three of these
responses (usually some combination of subjective experience, behavior, and
autonomic activity). These studies have reported a range of associations, from
modest correlations to no relationship to negative correlations among experien-
tial, behavioral, and physiological measures of emotion. (Barrett 2006, p. 33)
Following this interpretation, LC is a thesis about the correlation between different
measurements. LC would be thus established if for a given emotion category, we fail to
find that, for instance, skin conductance responses (physiological measure) for anger do
not correlate with anger expressions, or that neural activity for sadness fails to correlate
with retreat action tendencies characteristic of the emotion (behavioral measure).
Two main consequences have been drawn from accepting VT. First, findings
showing lack of correspondence and coordination have raised questions about the
natural kind status of emotions. Barrett (2006) explicitly argued that empirical evidence
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for variability suggests that emotions are not natural kinds. This move has further
motivated skepticism about the use of emotion categories in emotion research. For
example, based on VT, LeDoux (2012) has proposed a reconceptualization of how the
brain is involved in affective responses, one that makes no use of traditional emotion
categories:
I concur with [Barrett’s 2006] conclusion that the foundation of support for the
idea that basic emotions, as conventionally conceived, have dedicated neural
circuits is weak. This does not mean that the mammalian brain lacks innate
circuits that mediate fundamental phenomena relevant to emotion. It simply
means that emotions, as defined in the context of human basic emotions theory,
may not be the best way to conceive of the relevant innate circuits. (LeDoux
2012, p. 655)
Another important conclusion drawn from establishing VT is that emotions, rather than
having neural essences or physiological fingerprints, are constructed. This is the claim
at the base of Barrett’s Theory of Constructed Emotion. In one of the latest presenta-
tions of her view, Barrett (2017) explains:
A constructionist approach to emotion has a couple of core ideas. One idea is that
an emotion category such as anger or disgust does not have a fingerprint. One
instance of anger need not look or feel like another, nor will it be caused by the
same neurons. Variation is the norm. (Barrett 2017, pp. 32-33)
As I hope it is clear by now, VT is at the core of a number of important debates and
theories that dominate current emotion research. Moreover, it is taken as an established
claim, with an increasing amount of evidence interpreted through its lens. Yet, as I have
suggested, the claim is problematically underdefined.
2 Problems with VT
Recall Scarantino’s construal of VT as composed of two theses: NOC and LC. So
construed, NOC is a thesis about the mapping between emotion categories and patterns
of responses, while LC is a thesis about the correlation between these responses. Let us
analyze each of these claims in turn.
First, note that NOC admits a subdivision in terms in terms of the type of responses
that emotions could correspond to, i.e. neural, physiological, expressive, behavioral, or
phenomenological packages. Each of these NOC theses would claim that a given
emotion does not correspond one-to-one with a given type of response (e.g. one
emotion corresponding to two types of neural response). Thus, we can divide NOC into
NOCNeural: There is no one-to-one correspondence between emotion categories
and any pattern of neurobiological responses.
NOCPhysiological: There is no one-to-one correspondence between emotion catego-
ries and any pattern of physiological responses.
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NOCBehavioral: There is no one-to-one correspondence between emotion categories
and any pattern of behavioral responses.
NOCExpressive: There is no one-to-one correspondence between emotion categories
and any pattern of expressive responses.
NOCPhenomenological: There is no one-to-one correspondence between emotion cat-
egories and any pattern of phenomenological responses.
By dividing NOC into subcomponents, we can have a better idea of what sources of
empirical evidence would be relevant to test VT. However, this raises the question: is
NOC, as a general claim, a conjunction (NOCNeural & NOCPhysiological & NOCBehavioral &
NOCExpressive & NOCPhenomenological) or a disjunction (NOCNeural ∨ NOCPhysiological ∨
NOCBehavioral ∨ NOCExpressive ∨ NOCPhenomenological) of these sub-theses?
Interpreting NOC as a conjunction leads to an overly simplified claim. As soon as
we find correspondence in one domain, NOC will be false. For example, if an emotion
fails to correspond to neural, physiological, expressive, and phenomenological sets of
responses, but corresponds to one common behavioral pattern, NOC is falsified.
Consequently, we would have to reject VT, given that there is at least one domain
where correspondence holds. This is a consequence that defenders of VT would find
unacceptable, given that an important degree of variation would still hold.
On the other hand, interpreting NOC as a disjunction of the different sub-theses
leads to an overly demanding claim to reject. In this case, evidence for lack of
correspondence in one domain suffices to establish NOC and therefore to accept VT.
Given that the aforementioned characterization of NOC includes domains where
variability is expected (for example, in terms of action tendencies or expressions),
rejecting NOC becomes not only implausible, but trivial. Evidence for some degree of
variability in some domain abounds, rendering the question of variability almost
insignificant.
In order to escape these problems, researchers must decide which domains offer the
most relevant support for NOC. For example, basic emotion theorists would presum-
ably hold the neural and physiological domains as more relevant than the phenome-
nological domain, given their commitment to the idea that emotions must correspond to
patterns of physiological and neurological responses (see Ekman 1992; Ekman and
Cordaro 2011; Izard 2007, 2009; Panksepp 1998, 2008, 2011; Panksepp and Watt
2011). Unfortunately, emotion researchers have not reached a consensus regarding the
relevance of evidence in these domains. Without such consensus, it is impossible to
judge whether empirical evidence supports NOC, hence precluding us from drawing
any conclusions from this thesis.
Let us now turn to LC. As I explained above, LC is interpreted as a claim about the
presence or absence of correlations between different measurements. Yet, there are
three worries one can raise about this construal. First, given its appeal to correlations, it
is unclear which correlations (or lack thereof) are necessary or sufficient to reject (or
accept) LC. On the surface, we would consider the correlations between variables in
each of the aforementioned domains. However, each of these domains counts with
more than one variable. Consider the physiological domain. Among physiological
measures used to study emotions, we find three families (cardiovascular, respiratory,
and electrodermal), each with a wide range of possible measurements. Given the
different possible variables researchers could employ in their studies, we can ask: do
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we require correlations between all of these variables in all of these domains in order to
reject LC? If not, which correlations suffice? And to which degree?
Besides this worry, a second problem with the current construal of LC is that it is
unclear what it is for an emotion to obtain without anything we might call a package of
responses. On a naïve understanding of the claim, this would be a case where an
emotion obtains but no responses are observed. But then, why would we accept that an
emotion obtains? If there are no neurological, physiological, behavioral, expressive, or
phenomenological responses, there is no emotion either. It seems clear that this is not
the intended interpretation. But which one is it then?
Perhaps the most plausible interpretation of the claim is that LC is true when an
emotion obtains along with some responses, but these responses fail to correlate
between each other. One such case would be an instance of fear where, for example,
the neural and the behavioral responses fail to correlate. This may be due to there being
several behavioral responses (fight or flight) with one common neural underlying
response (for the sake of argument, suppose that this is amygdala activity; I shall go
back to the nuances of this example below). Such an interpretation would also make the
matter trivial though. For any emotion, there could be a myriad of possible behavioral
patterns even if each emotion mapped one-to-one onto neural responses. The same may
apply for expressive patterns, which vary depending on context (Elfenbein and
Ambady 2002; Gendron et al. 2014) and do not map one-to-one onto many emotions.
On this interpretation, LC becomes true by any sort of variation in any of these
domains, making it a vacuous claim.
Someone might object that what we require then are criteria to individuate the
patterns of responses referred to by LC. To avoid rendering LC trivial, the objection
holds, we just need to specify on which level of abstraction we would consider a group
of responses a pattern, so as to proceed to test correlations between these patterns and
emotion categories. This move, however, raises a third worry that deserves special
attention, namely, that it is unclear how we should individuate patterns of responses. In
each of the domains in question, there are a number of ways in which researchers might
consider a set of responses a pattern. This makes it difficult to decide the matter
empirically. Without an answer to how to individuate patterns of responses, we cannot
determine whether these patterns are correlated, hence leaving LC undetermined.
Furthermore, this worry also affects NOC, since without criteria of pattern individua-
tion, we cannot determine whether emotion categories correspond to a given pattern or
not. In what follows, I will explore this difficulty in detail.
3 Individuating Sets of Responses
3.1 Neural Patterns
Traditional accounts of emotion that emphasized the role of neural mechanisms in
emotions thought of emotions as relating to the activity in specific and consistent
regions in the brain. According to these views, there must be something in the brain that
is domain-specific to each emotion category. These are for example LeDoux’s studies
on fear conditioning (LeDoux 2003, 2007, 2013; see also Phelps and LeDoux 2005),
which attempted to map fear onto amygdala activity, or Panksepp’s (1998, 2011)
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attempt to individuate subcortical structures underlying primary emotional processes.
Following Lindquist et al. (2012), let’s call these locationist accounts:
[Locationist accounts] hypothesize that all mental states belonging to the same
emotion category (e.g., fear) are produced by activity that is consistently and
specifically associated with an architecturally defined brain locale […] or ana-
tomically defined networks of locales that are inherited and shared with other
mammalian species. (pp. 122-123)
We can distinguish two types of locationism. On one type, anatomical locationism,
mental states belonging to the same emotion category correspond consistently and
specifically to an architecturally defined brain region.2 On a second type, homological
loactionism, they correspond to inherited networks shared with other mammalian
species.
According to anatomical locationism, Neural holds that a given emotion category
corresponds to activity in more than one region or no specific region at all. In turn, LC
holds that activity in a specific brain region does not correlate with responses in other
domains. Empirical evidence supports Neural in the anatomical locationist sense. Early
meta-analyses showed some promising results mapping, for instance, fear to the
amygdala or sadness to the subcallosal cingulate cortex (Murphy et al. 2003; Phan
et al. 2002). However, they also suggested some degree of overlap. For example, the
fact that both happiness and disgust were associated with basal ganglia activation
suggests that these areas are not unique to either emotion, but rather are involved in
some general process.
Later meta-analyses stressed this kind of findings. Most famously, Lindquist et al.
(2012) analyzed a considerable amount of studies, including those analyzed in previous
meta-analyses, claiming that correspondence between emotion categories and brain
locations failed to obtain. For example, they claimed that the amygdala, a region
traditionally associated with fear, was instead involved in “signaling whether extero-
ceptive sensory information is motivationally salient” (Lindquist et al. 2012, p. 130),
since it had also been observed in other tasks such as orienting responses to motiva-
tionally relevant stimuli, novel and unusual stimuli. Moreover, lesions to the amygdala
do not only affect fear responses, but also responses to other relevant stimuli in general.
Additionally, their analyses revealed that amygdala activity was also significantly
associated with disgust, indicating some degree of overlap between different emotions.
Similar claims followed for the rest of the so-called basic emotions. For every candidate
region that would correspond to a given emotion category, Lindquist et al. argued that it
was involved in more general processes and hence that there was no correspondence
between emotion categories and the activity of specific brain regions.
The aforementioned results offer good reasons to accept NOCNeural provided we
adopt anatomical locationism. But what about adopting homological locationism
instead? According to homological locationism, the relevant level at which we should
individuate neural patterns is not at the level of specific anatomical locations, but at the
level of networks that are inherited, anatomically constrained, and have homologues in
other mammals (Panksepp 2008). Thus, NOCNeural would not be established by failure
2 Scarantino (2012a) calls this radical locationism.
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to find corresponding activity in specific brain locations, but rather if we fail to find
innate, anatomically intrinsic networks.
One example of a homological locationist view is Panksepp’s (1998, 2011).
Panksepp claims that in order to individuate the neural patterns in the brain, we must
rely on comparative studies using non-human animals to find evolutionarily adapted
networks. He presents evidence for subcortical networks that interconnect midbrain
circuits with various structures in the basal ganglia, such as the amygdala and the
nucleus accumbens, through pathways running through the hypothalamus and thala-
mus. Among the networks he identifies, he includes SEEKING, RAGE, FEAR, LUST,
CARE, PANIC, and PLAY networks (Panksepp 2011).
Evidence for homological locationism often involves studies in non-human animals.
Studies of this sort include studies on fear conditioning (LeDoux 2003) or studies on
subcortical circuits (Panksepp 1998, 2011). Research of this sort is still promising and
suggests that there may be inherent networks underlying at least some emotional
reactions. For example, Yilmaz and Meister found that mice reliably engaged in
escaping or freezing behavior when a specific visual stimulus was presented. More
interestingly, the researchers could manipulate the probability that mice would engage
in either of these behaviors depending on the physical properties of the stimulus,
suggesting that these physical properties activate automatic, rapid firing inherent
circuits underlying fear reactions (Yilmaz and Meister 2013).
There is nevertheless evidence against the presence of intrinsic networks in the brain
as well. Touroutoglou et al. (2014) show that increases in activity during emotion
experience and perception do not map onto intrinsic networks in the brain using resting
state connectivity fMRI. Instead, they report finding domain-general networks involved
in emotional experience, which in their view supports the claim that there is nothing we
can call a coordinated package of neural responses in terms of intrinsic networks. For
example, for fear, sadness, and happiness, they found a general dorsal region
connecting the anterior insula and the anterior cingulate cortex. Consequently, they
conclude that even adopting homological locationism, Neural would still be
established.
Besides locationism as a general view of emotion-brain mapping, a second view has
emerged in recent years, one stemming from a functionalist framework. Instead of
trying to individuate patterns in terms of domain-specific intrinsic networks, we could
take the relevant neural patterns to be at the level of regions that show correlated
activation even in the absence of an intrinsic network, i.e. functional networks.
A prime example of this approach is the one involved in multivariate pattern
analyses (MPVA). One of the earlier studies using these techniques is Kassam et al.
(2013). In this experiment, subjects saw different emotion words while inside a MRI
scanner and were asked to attain the corresponding emotional state for a period of time.
The researchers then trained a classifier on fMRI data in order to test whether the
classifier could accurately predict the subject’s emotional state. Kassam et al. report that
their classifier was able to successfully predict a subject’s emotional state from their
neural data in a given trial. They report that this classification was accurate between
77% and 89% of the time. After Kassam et al. (2013), other studies followed suit.
Using film and instrumental music induction followed by self-report, Kragel and LaBar
(2015) managed to classify seven emotional states using MVPA on neural activation
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data (contentment, amusement, surprise, fear, anger, sadness, and neutral) with 37.3%
accuracy (chance = 14.3%).
One recent study has gained special attention among defenders of multivariate
approaches to emotion: Saarimäki et al. (2018). In this study, participants heard 4
narratives for each of 14 emotional states plus a neutral condition. The classifier in this
case managed to classify most of the target emotions. Altogether, 12 emotions (ex-
cluding longing and shame) could be reliably classified from fMRI signals. From these
findings, Saarimäki et al. conclude that multiple emotion states have distinct and
distributed neural bases. In their view, many emotions are represented in the brain in
distinct yet overlapping regions. They claim that each emotion state likely modulates
different patterns measured with fMRI, and the overall configuration of the regional
activation patterns defines the resulting emotion.
As explained above, it is crucial to these findings that the classification of brain
activity corresponding to an emotion is not in terms of specific regions of activation,
but as patterns throughout the whole brain. This substantially affects questions about
coordination and correspondence. In the first case, we must decide at which point a
pattern counts as delimited enough to be considered a candidate to correspondence. In
the second, we must decide whether correspondence with networks counts as explan-
atorily relevant in the context of variability. In other words, we must decide whether
mapping emotions onto brain networks is explanatorily interesting or whether we must
keep the level of analysis at the level of locations.
Questions of this sort are reminiscent to debates on cognitive ontology (Anderson 2015;
Price and Friston 2005). A cognitive ontology consists of criteria to map cognitive
functions to anatomical structures, such that we can infer one from the other. This includes
characterizing what the specific functions of particular brain structures are and how these
functions contribute to the overall function being addressed by a given cognitive task. The
case of emotions is analogous: we must have a set of criteria to map emotions onto brain
structures. Furthermore, just as in the case of cognitive function, this may call for different
approaches. Anderson (2015) distinguishes three views, depending on the degree to which
researchers must revise their current psychological framework. We can either attempt to
preserve as much of the current framework as possible, revise it until it fits our best
characterization of brain activity, or modify it radically to the point of revising our
theoretical primitives themselves. I will not attempt to defend a particular approach here,
since this requires a detailed discussion of both theoretical and empirical claims. Never-
theless, it is a decision that is pending in emotion research, one that only until recently has
begun to be put on the table (Celeghin et al. 2017; Scarantino 2012b).
3.2 Physiological Patterns
Besides looking into neural activity associated with emotion, another important source
of evidence comes from studies on physiology. Physiological activity in the context of
emotions generally refers to three types of autonomic3 variables. First, there is activity
3 Strictly speaking, not all physiological responses concern the autonomic nervous system. Other physiolog-
ical responses include, for example, muscle tension, or even neural responses. In order to avoid cashing out
neural responses as a subset of physiological responses while making clear what these refer to, I shall use the
term physiology as interchangeable with autonomic.
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related to the cardiac system, which includes heart rate variability, blood pressure,
cardiac cycles, and the like. Second, we find variables regarding respiration, e.g.
respiratory cycles, respiration period, amplitude, etc. Lastly, there are variables
concerning electrodermal activity, i.e. skin conductance levels, responses, resistance,
etc.
Given these types of physiological variables, whether or not there are coordinated
patterns of physiological activity can be broken down into two criteria. One is
determining whether there is patterning within a class of variables. We can ask whether
there are specific patterns concerning cardiac, respiratory, or electrodermal activity for a
particular emotion. Additionally, we can investigate patterning between the classes of
variables, i.e. whether cardiac, respiratory, and electrodermal activity are robustly
correlated and form a homogeneous set of responses for each emotion.
Early studies of physiological activity tried to show autonomic constants across
different emotions. In one of their first studies, Ekman et al. (1983) asked subjects to
contract specific muscles in order to mirror implicitly a given facial expression without
telling them which expression it was, or asked them to relive an experience that would
elicit a given emotion. During these tasks, the investigators measured the subjects’ heart
rate, left- and right-hand temperatures, skin resistance, and forearm muscle tension.
Ekman et al. report that autonomic variables change significantly depending on the
emotion. They found that heart rate and temperature increased for anger, as well as
heart rate increases for fear, in contrast to happiness. The researchers also hold that they
were able to distinguish disgust from anger, fear, and sadness in the first task, and
sadness from disgust, anger, and fear in the second. In a later report (Levenson et al.
1990), the same researchers report similar findings.
As in the case of neural activity, more recent studies have introduced multivariate
techniques to look for physiological patterns. Rainville et al. (2006), for example, used
principal component analysis (PCA) to see which variables were the most useful when
classifying different emotions from data on autonomic responses. As in other studies,
they used autobiographical recall methods to elicit anger, fear, happiness, and sadness.
They measured a number of variables regarding respiration and cardiac cycles, includ-
ing respiration period, amplitude, heart-rate variability, and others.
In their analyses, the researchers report some differences in these variables as a
function of emotion. For example, they claim that respiratory period decreased in fear
and happiness and less consistently in anger, while the variability in respiratory period
increased in sadness. Overall, the researchers claim that this study provides some
evidence that basic emotions are associated with distinctive patterns of cardiorespira-
tory activity. Different emotions were distinguished from a neutral condition based on
different subsets of dependent variables and multi-dimensional exploration of the data
revealed complex patterns of activity that characterized each emotion. According to the
PCA, the variance in cardiorespiratory activity can be explained along five dimensions,
mostly related to heart-rate variability.
Recent meta-analyses also reveal some autonomic specificity for emotion. Kreibig
(2010), for instance, covered 134 publications and examined three classes of variables:
cardiovascular, respiratory, and electrodermal. She reports specific patterns for a great
number of emotions. For example, she claims that anger involves faster breathing as
seen in shortened inspiration and expiration times, more expiration than inspiration,
increased heart rate, increased overall blood pressure, among others. Fear elicited a
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similar pattern, involving broad sympathetic activation, cardiac acceleration, increased
vaso-constriction, and increased electrodermal activity. However, in the case of fear,
peripheral resistance decreased whereas it increased for anger.
Despite the studies supporting autonomic specificity, there are also important
challenges. In a recent meta-analysis, Siegel et al. (2018) evaluated empirical evidence
in favor or against specificity. The authors included 204 studies from 1950 to 2013, and
studied the same three-fold division of variables used by Kreibig, namely, cardiovas-
cular, respiratory, and electrodermal measures. To do this, they compared the effect
sizes across all their studies. Some results display mean ANS changes from baseline
across several effect sizes but with substantial variability. For instance, the patterns of
anger and fear showed large effect sizes, suggesting that their physiological patterns
differed significantly from baseline across several autonomic variables (specifically,
heart rate, cardiac output, diastolic and systolic blood pressure). Yet, these effect sizes
are very heterogeneous, indicating that even though these emotions have clear physi-
ological effects, these effects are not uniform and do not form a stable pattern.4
Other results show small mean ANS changes and moderate variability. For example,
the researchers report the cases of disgust and neutral categories. For disgust, only skin
conductance level and responses had relevant effect sizes, but only the latter was
homogeneous. For neutral conditions, only systolic blood pressure had an interesting
mean effect size, but it is also a heterogeneous variable. Happiness and sadness had
increased effect sizes in heart rate, diastolic blood pressure, skin conductance level, and
others, but they are mostly heterogeneous. As a result, most mean ANS changes were
not uniform. Additionally, the researchers claim that ANS changes were not specific to
a given emotion category either. Happiness had a mean increase in skin conductance
level similar to disgust, anger, fear, and sadness, for example.
We can now interpret evidence challenging physiological specificity using the
categories presented above. On one hand, there is evidence suggesting that there is
low coordination between cardiac, respiratory, and electrodermal variables. Evidence
of the first type presented by Siegel et al. is one example. As they suggest, correlations
between physiological variables preclude their classification as a specific pattern. On
the other hand, there seems to be evidence showing low coordination within physio-
logical variables, as presented in the second group of findings reported by Siegel et al.
According to this argument, some physiological variables have more impact than others
in determining the ensuing emotion. As a result, given the lack of correlation between
physiological variables, the researchers claim that there is no physiological specificity
for emotion.
Nevertheless, settling this discussion requires further methodological and epistemo-
logical decisions. First, it is unclear whether all physiological variables should have the
same influence when considering whether there is a coordinated pattern or not. Often
used variables such as heart-rate variability surely are among the most important ones
to consider. Yet, the status of other variables such as respiration period or vaso-
constriction is left undecided.
4 It is worth noting that heterogeneity in effect sizes might be accounted for by differences in intensity rather
than physiological variability. This would mean that variability more of an artifact rather than a metaphysical
fact about emotions themselves.
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Second, both optimistic and skeptical researchers fail to distinguish between within-
and between-variable coordination. This leads to an ambiguity that affects both camps.
On one hand, it could be the case that we need correlations among variables of the same
type (say, respiratory variables) in order to consider that there is a robust physiological
pattern (i.e., a respiratory pattern). On the other hand, we may not demand correlations
within a given family of variables, but rather between some measures of different types.
For instance, we may expect some cardiovascular measures to correlate with some
electrodermal ones, without the requirement that there are within-variable patterns. As
it stands now, researchers highlight evidence showing that one measure is associated
with a given emotion or that another is not, without a clear argument as to whether it is
necessary that all measures of a given type correlate with one another or whether it is
necessary that some measures of different types do so.
Lastly, similar to the discussion regarding neural patterns, the use of multivariate
techniques is still controversial. Presumably, lots of physiological processes obtain
when we experience an emotion or any other state. As a result, whether or not the
ability to classify them with analyses such as PCA tell us something explanatorily
relevant remains unclear. Skeptics may argue that the mere presence of a statistical
pattern says little about the causal mechanisms involved in emotion. Optimists may
react by pointing out that multivariate techniques are nevertheless more robust and that
they do not claim that there is just any pattern at play.
3.3 Behavioral Patterns
Behavioral patterns refer to possible behavioral outcomes of an emotion episode. In the
current literature, the best account of the behavioral patterns of emotion comes from
appraisal theories. According to these theories, emotions involve states of action
readiness (Frijda et al. 1989). On one influential construal, action readiness is cashed
out as the individual’s readiness or unreadiness to engage in interaction with the
environment. This may consist in readiness to engage or disengage from interaction
with some object in a particular way (action tendency) or in a general state of activation
or inhibition of behavior (activation modes) (Frijda 2007).
Some researchers claim that we can differentiate between emotions by appealing to
the different states of action readiness they elicit. On one such study, Frijda et al. (1989)
asked subjects to recall instances of emotions and asked them to rate different state-
ments concerning various action patterns. These statements included descriptions such
as “I wanted to approach or make contact” or “I wanted to oppose, to assault.” They
then tried to map patterns of action to emotion names by investigating how well they
could predict the emotion label from these patterns. Frijda and colleagues report some
predictability for 32 emotion categories. Among the highly correlated patterns they
report crying for sadness, protecting one self for fear and anxiety, moving against an
object for anger, avoidance for disgust, and hiding from others for shame, among
others. This suggests that there may be some correspondence between action readiness
states and emotion categories, speaking against NOCBehavioral.
Other studies have yielded similar results. Roseman et al. (1994) used as similar
experimental design, asking subjects to recall past emotional experiences and answer a
questionnaire that tapped into their behavioral outcomes. The researchers claim that
their experiment shows clear distinctions between 12 emotions in terms of their action
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tendencies. Among the tendencies reported, we find fear as a readiness to reduce the
possibility of harm, sadness as crying and seeking comfort, disgust as attempting to get
something noxious out of the body, among others.
In spite of these optimistic efforts, cashing out emotions in terms of action readiness
and action tendencies does not go without problems. On one hand, there is some
observed variability. In Frijda et al. (1989) we find one action pattern corresponding to
two emotions (e.g. protecting oneself in fear and anxiety). On the surface, this would
only mean that variability in terms of behavior is still controversial. However, the
problem runs even deeper.
Critics of appraisal theories have argued that the links between emotions and action
tendencies may as well be a matter of conceptual truth rather than empirical fact. If so,
questions about correspondence become trivial; emotions will trivially correspond to
behavior patterns (just as water corresponds to H2O.) Consider the presumed corre-
spondence between fear and engaging in behavior towards protecting oneself in
situations of perceived harm. Suppose we attempt to falsify such correspondence. We
would need to be able to obtain a fear state that does not involve such a behavioral
tendency. Yet, arguably, that tendency is precisely what it means to be in a fearful state.
As a result, any candidate state to falsify this supposed hypothesis would not count as a
fear state as a matter of conceptual fact.
This problem can be brought to light by considering moves to ameliorate it.
Roseman (2011), in response to the variability between emotions and behavioral
outcomes, argues that emotions are consistent at the level of coping strategies. He
claims, for instance, that fear forms a consistent pattern insofar as it involves a strategy
to quickly and urgently move away from or stop moving toward some danger (or at
least some description of the sort). Even if we sophisticate such a description to involve
other behavioral aspects of fear, we could still ask: what would it mean for this
description to be inadequate (i.e. for its correspondence with an emotion category not
to be the case)? Presumably, this correlation obtains, not as a contingent fact, but
because the behavioral outcome provides a definition of what it means to be afraid. To
use Smedlund’s (1992) example, these results are as if we discovered that bachelors are
male and single.
A similar worry runs regarding LC. Any behavioral outcome that may correspond to
a give emotion, even if not one-to-one, can be spelled out to yield a correlation with
some neural and physiological state. In this sense, coordination between the neural and
physiological domain would be almost trivially true. If we cut out behavioral patterns
with too fine a grain, we risk rendering these correlations meaningless. One can resist
this result by clarifying that triviality only obtains if neural and physiological states are
interpreted as token states, not as types, i.e., by adopting a coarser grain. Still, the
question of how to spell out these patterns properly remains unanswered.
3.4 Expressive Patterns
The issue of whether there are expressive patterns for each emotion has its roots in the
issue of the universality of facial expressions. Broadly construed, the question is
whether there is a set of universally recognized and produced expressions correspond-
ing to each emotion (or a subset thereof). As Russell (1994) formulates it, the thesis of
universality can be divided into four propositions:
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(a) Specific patterns of facial muscle movement occur in all human beings.
(b) Certain facial patterns are manifestations of the same emotions in all human
beings.
(c) Observers everywhere attribute the same emotional meaning to those facial
patterns.
(d) Observers are correct in the emotions they (consensually) attribute to those facial
patterns. (cf. Russell 1994, p. 106)
Let us focus on the first two propositions.5 The first of these propositions relates to the
specificity of the facial expressions themselves (i.e. to their coordination). The second,
to their correspondence to emotional states (i.e. NOCExpressive).
The main defender of universality is Ekman (see e.g. Ekman 1972, 1980; Ekman
and Friesen 1971; Ekman et al. 1969, 1983, 1987). Ekman has conducted a number of
studies allegedly establishing the universality of at least some facial expressions (those
corresponding to the so-called basic emotions). Among these studies, perhaps they
most often cited is that by Ekman and Friesen (1971). Ekman and Friesen (1971)
conducted a study in a remote culture that would have had no contact with Western
cultures, the Fore group in New Guinea. In the experiment, the researchers showed
subjects three photographs of different facial expressions and told them a story.
Subjects then chose the photograph that matched the story’s emotional content. Stories
included content for happiness, sadness, anger, surprise, disgust, and fear. Ekman and
Friesen report that subjects were generally able to identify the correct photograph at a
high success rate. In their view, this result provided evidence that there were facial
expressions that were universally recognizable, even in cultures with no contact with
Western societies. In later years, Ekman et al. (1987) would use this method in other
Western cultures and replicate these findings.
Even though these findings are sometimes taken as granted, universality is still
controversial. Arguments against universality come in two main strands. The first strand
of criticism intends to cast doubt on the robustness of the findings presumably supporting
universality, showing flaws in the designs as well as the assumptions of a number of
studies. The second strand tries to outweigh empirical evidence for universality by
underscoring cultural variation. Whereas the first strand presupposes that we already
know what evidence is relevant for the question of universality (it only claims that
researchers have failed to obtain such evidence), the second strand concerns precisely
what type of evidence would establish universality or not, thereby offering grounds for or
against NOCExpressive and LC. Consequently, I shall focus on the second strand.
Attacks of this type on universality come from two sources. One is evidence
showing that agreement among cultures regarding which facial movements correspond
to which emotions has been overstated. Rather than finding robust agreement, re-
searchers have showed that agreement drops under certain conditions. One example
is the meta-analysis by Elfenbein and Ambady (2002). Using the same data as that in
Ekman’s studies, among others, Elfenbein and Ambady show that members of a given
group are more accurate in judging expressions of members of their same group.
5 The third and fourth propositions relate to the observers of these facial expressions. Given that these
propositions concern our attribution of emotions through expressions rather than the presence of the expres-
sion themselves, I will leave them aside.
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Specifically, they report that Western participants are 9.3% more accurate when
judging other Western faces than with African or Asian ones. Even if overall recogni-
tion is still above chance level, these results suggest that accuracy scores depend on
culture and are not as uniform as defenders of universality might think.
The other source of evidence against universality are studies showing differences
between different populations in terms of their perception and categorization of facial
expressions. Examples involve studies in a number of cultures. Elfenbein and Ambady
themselves claim that when analyzing data in terms of individual emotions, some
emotions are poorly recognized universally. In their meta-analysis, they found that fear
and disgust are the most poorly recognized, even though they are among the most cited
candidates to universal, biologically basic emotions. According to them, this implies
that culture still shapes meaning of faces even in the presence of some uniformity.
Other studies also showmismatch betweenWestern and non-Western interpretations
of faces. Crivelli and Fridlund (2018) report that communities from the Trobiand
islands in New Guinea understand gasping faces as threat displays instead of fear
displays, as traditional studies have attempted to show. Similarly, Gendron et al. (2014)
found that the Himba people of Namibia perceive facial actions in context, that is, not
as corresponding to a feeling but to the whole situation. For example, instead of
interpreting crying as corresponding to a feeling of sadness, they situate it as a response
to death. Jack et al. (2012) report that East Asian facial expressions overlap, leading to
fuzzy categorization contrasting with Western taxonomies. Along the same lines, Jack
et al. (2016) claim that in Chinese societies categorize emotions into more categories
than English samples when asked to judge facial expressions.
Evidence for cultural variation in emotion expression production and recognition tries to
dismantle the second proposition presented above, namely, that emotional expressions are
manifestations of the same emotions in all humans. On the face of it, there could be
universal patterns of expression (assuming the methodological criticism is misguided), but
they do not correspond to the same emotions everywhere. If this is true, then we would
have evidence to reject LC, but also we would have to accept NOCExpressive.
Apart from showing how universality is controversial, I suspect these findings
suggest that the question of the universality of emotional expression is a different topic
altogether that does not have much bearing on the issue of variability. Even if there
were no universal patterns of emotional expression (LC) and hence no correspondence
with emotions (NOCExpressive), would that entail that emotions are variable phenomena?
Plausibly not. The reason is that there could still be fixed, even innate patterns at the
neural or physiological level that would grant emotions some robust form of homoge-
neity. Otherwise, we would be forced to split emotion categories in terms of their
different expressions even in presence of evidence for neural and physiological homo-
geneity. If this line of argument is correct, it follows that evidence on the universality of
emotional expression is at best unnecessary to determine whether variability is the case
or not. Even if universality of expression wasn’t the case, there could still be good
reasons—perhaps even stronger reasons—to decide for or against variability, such as
the potential presence (or absence) of homogeneous physiological or neural patterns.
Moreover, I suggest that not only is universality unnecessary to decide variability,
but that it is also plausibly insufficient. Let us assume that universality of expression is
the case. Let us also assume, for the sake of argument, that there is no homogeneity at
other levels. In such a case, we would have a mapping from one fixed emotional
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expression to many neural, physiological, behavioral and phenomenological patterns.
This quite plausibly would not qualify as evidence to reject variability, as there would
still be solid grounds to hold emotions as naturally disjoined phenomena even if they
map onto specific expressions. The absence of homogeneous patterns at all other levels
would indicate that emotions lack the sort of unity that might be relevant to form the
types of kinds a science of emotions looks after. While it is true that this picture is
empirically implausible, given that universality of expression would probably entail
other kinds of patterns (e.g. fixed physiological patterns), this suggests that universality
is perhaps only interesting as a proxy for other types of patterns rather than a way to
decide variability by itself.
Additionally, someone may object that expressions are still a central part of our
emotion attribution and behavioral manifestation. Yet, this would then reduce expres-
sions to subsets of behavioral patterns. As a consequence, there would be no reason to
consider expressive patterns as separate from behavioral patterns (action tendencies)
altogether. In other words, expressions are at best part of our action tendencies, and at
worst irrelevant to the case of variability.
3.5 Phenomenological Patterns
Phenomenological patterns are often understood as patterns of subjective experience.
What exactly characterizes subjective experience is nevertheless unclear. Subjective
experience, taken as a criterion to individuate patterns candidate to correspondence and
coordination, fails on two grounds. First, the phenomena subjects and theorists describe
as subjective can plausibly be reduced to other types of patterns already under
consideration, such as collections of neural and physiological states as well as action
tendencies (behavioral patterns). Second, even if there is some remainder in terms of
qualitative experiences, there are good reasons to doubt these can successfully help us
individuate emotions, thus precluding claims even about their variability.
A first approximation to tap into phenomenological patterns of emotions is to rely on
self-report data, asking subjects to narrate or describe their own emotional experience.
One influential example of such an approach is the work by Davitz (1969). Davitz
undertook to develop a dictionary of emotions that synthesized how people use
language to refer to their own emotional states. Based on a short list of emotion terms
(Affection, Anger, Anxiety, Boredom, Cheerfulness, Confidence, Impatience, Sadness,
and Satisfaction), he interviewed people asking them how they would describe each
state and recorded their reports. To this list of statements he then added more descrip-
tions from 1200 subjects who were asked to think of concrete instances of each
emotion. From these reports Davitz obtained a list of 556 statements about emotion
experience. Lastly, he asked a third group to rate how adequate each statement was to
describe their own experiences. With this material in hand, he compiled the most used
descriptions for each term into the dictionary.
A short examination of the definitions and statements found in Davitz’s dictionary
shows that many of the descriptions presumed to tap into subjective experience can be
reduced to other patterns. For example, ‘anger’ includes among its most common
descriptions ‘my blood pressure goes up,’ ‘my pulse quickens,’ or ‘my heart pounds.’
In the case of sadness, we find ‘there is a lump in my throat,’ ‘there is a clutching,
sinking feeling in the middle of my chest,’ and ‘I have no appetite.’ Similar descriptions
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can be found for other emotions terms as well. In these cases, it is easy to see that these
patterns can be described as physiological patterns corresponding to each emotion.
Other patterns in Davitz’s dictionary’s entries refer rather to action tendencies. In the
cases above, anger includes ‘my fists are clenched,’ ‘there is an impulse to hurt, to hit,
or to kick someone else,’ and sadness, ‘tears well up’ or ‘I cry.’
Perhaps a more sophisticated approach to the phenomenology of emotion is found in
Lambie and Marcel (2002). Lambie and Marcel distinguish three types of questions
regarding the empirical investigation of emotions: (a) what is the content of emotion
experience as it is experienced?, (b) to what nonconscious process or representation does
emotion experience correspond?; and (c) what processes or differences in content lead to
and contribute to emotion experience? In their view, only the first of these questions tackles
phenomenology.
To answer the question of what is the content of emotion experience, Lambie and
Marcel separate between emotion states and emotion experiences. Emotion states are
the functional aspects of emotion apart from conscious experience, which include
primary appraisals of events in terms of relevance to the organism, the activation of
brain and bodily systems, and preparation for action. Emotion experiences are both the
phenomenological aspects of emotional states (first-order experience) and the aware-
ness of these experiences themselves (second-order experience).
For the purposes of evaluating NOC and LC, following Lambie and Marcel, we would
have to decide at which level are emotions individuated. Suppose we decide that they must
be individuated at the first-order experience level. Characterizing first-order experience is
problematic for a number of reasons. As Lambie and Marcel recognize, our first mode of
access to first-order experience is by introspection, which requires awareness of it, which in
turns changes the first-order experience itself. The authors suggest that we can instead rely
on memory and episodic reinstatement to tap into previous episodes of first-order experi-
ence, circumventing this problem. Yet, there is good evidence on memory manipulation
showing that memory is also affected by our current epistemic states (Brown and Marsh
2008; Edelson et al. 2011; Loftus 2005; Mazzoni and Memon 2003). If this is the case,
relying on episodic reinstatement does not fix the problem.
A second worry regarding first-order experience is that, as Lambie and Marcel have
characterized it, it includes aspects that are again reducible to other patterns. Given that
first-order experience has underlying brain and bodily states, as well as involving action
tendencies and appraisals, it is unclear why this level of description would yield a different
type of pattern at all. As the characterization stands, Lambie and Marcel have suggested
facets of neural, physiological, and behavioral patterns that are involved in emotion, but
have not shown that there is something uniquely phenomenological worth separating.
One may object that these reductions leave the qualitative character of emotion
experience untouched. In the same vein as proponents of the explanatory gap in
philosophy of mind (Chalmers 1997; Levine 1983) one could argue that physical or
behavioral states do not exhaustively describe pure forms of emotion experience. An
argument of this sort seems to be in the background of LeDoux’s (2012, 2013; LeDoux
and Brown 2017) claim that emotions and feelings should be used interchangeably. As
a consequence, LeDoux recommends not making reference to emotions when we talk
about circuits underlying survival behavioral dispositions, and instead looking for a
theory of emotional consciousness as a theory of emotion.
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This approach would entail individuating emotions by their qualitative character
alone. As the record of discussions on the hard problem of consciousness attests,
problems soon arise. First, to do this we need an account of how we could ground
emotion concepts on first-person qualitative properties. Since we presumably do not
have access to others’ first-person experiences, we seem to fall prey of arguments such
as Wittgenstein’s private language argument (Wittgenstein 1953/2009). According to a
broad and naïve construal of this argument, it is nonsensical to think that the meaning of
concepts such as ‘red’ or ‘yellow’ (and in this case ‘sadness’ and ‘fear’) can grounded in
first-person experience, since we would have no public criteria for their correct appli-
cation. This leaves us with concepts on which we cannot construct a scientific theory.
Second, we could resist the private language argument (and other similar ones) and
insist that there is no reason why it would be impossible to ground phenomenal
properties on publicly available criteria. There are good reasons to doubt that reductions
of the phenomenal character of consciousness are impossible in principle (see e.g.
Pauen 2017), hence opening the door for third-person descriptions. In other words, we
can reject the explanatory gap and defend the possibility of describing phenomenality
in functional terms. This is for instance what LeDoux and Brown (2017) attempt in
offering a theory of emotional consciousness. If this were so however, then we would
be able to describe phenomenality in neural, physiological, or behavioral terms, thus
diluting the category of phenomenological patterns into the other three.
Lastly, it is doubtful that the appeal to irreducible qualitative properties provides a
tractable account at all. It is difficult to see, on their qualitative aspects alone, how
emotions can differ from one another. This case is clear for emotions that are similar to
one another like anger and indignation, or joy from pride (Prinz 2007, p. 52). However,
it is even more pressing for comparisons between intuitively very different emotions
such as anger and fear, which are more similar to each other than, for instance,
happiness and fear. Without invoking non-qualitative properties such as valence (which
is ultimately a relational property),6 we cannot explain many differences between
emotions (for an argument in this direction, see Frijda et al. 1989, p. 227).
Let us grant then that first-order experience cannot do the trick. We may still claim
that phenomenological pattern individuation can obtain at the level of second-order
awareness. Second-order awareness can be characterized, according to Lambie and
Marcel, in two ways. In some cases, our emotion experience is directed to the self.
These are cases where we, for example, experience anger as an offense to our own
selves or sadness as an own failure. In other cases, emotion experience is directed to the
world. Here our emotions are describable in terms of objects, as when we experience
6 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer who pointed out that qualitative properties might be relational. They
consider the case of orange differing from yellow in that it is more red. In my view, while it is true that we
might be able to describe some qualitative properties relationally, we must also assume a fixed base on which
to ground such descriptions. In the case of orange, it is because we have a fixed set of primary colors which
include yellow and red that we can describe other colors relationally. In the case of emotion however, it is
unclear which qualitative base we can assume to ground such descriptions. The reason why valence does not
provide a good candidate is that since it is relational, it must be defined in virtue of other non-relational
qualitative properties for which there is no good candidate and that even if there were, as I suggest before, they
would fall prey of the private language argument. Hence, it is difficult to see how to ground descriptions of
different emotion categories based on irreducible qualitative properties, which by extension would undermine
the description of emotion categories in virtue of relationally described qualitative properties.
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the object of our anger as something offensive or blameworthy, or sadness as present-
ing a world that is unfulfilling.
The case for phenomenological pattern individuation at the second-order awareness
level resembles attempts in appraisal theories to individuate emotions in terms of core-
relational themes (Lazarus 1991). It is also reminiscent of other approaches in phenome-
nology proposed by enactivists (Colombetti 2009, 2017; Hutto 2012). In both of these
cases, second-order awareness refers to an experience of an emotion in terms of the relation
between an organism and its environment, whether it is focused on the standing of the self
as related to objects or focused towards properties of the objects as appraised by the self.
If this interpretation is correct, second-order awareness may be described in terms of
other patterns as well, namely, as action tendencies. Both appraisal theorists and
enactivists stress the idea that the phenomenology of emotion, so construed, is essen-
tially linked to our possibilities of action given a relation with the environment. In a
broad understanding of action tendencies, we can describe these relations as possible
behavioral outcomes an organism may experience in a given moment. Again, phenom-
enology is described as part of other patterns already considered, casting doubts on the
decision to separate it into its own category.
As a result, the individuation of phenomenological patterns as a separate category of
patterns that would be candidates for correspondence and coordination seems unprom-
ising. Either we get stuck with problems in grounding concepts in first-person experi-
ence, hence precluding us from establishing any claims regarding their variability, or, if
we can overcome such an obstacle, we would be able to reduce phenomenal patterns to
other patterns which turn out to be the relevant ones to decide for or against variability.
Consequently, I propose leaving the qualitative character of emotional experience
separate from the problem of variability or taking it as a result of other relevant patterns.
4 How to Evaluate Variability
In this article, I have argued that the Variability Thesis (VT), as construed in emotion
research at the moment, is an ill-defined thesis. I raised some ambiguities regarding
some of its logical properties, and then suggested that apart from these problems, there
are difficulties spelling out what counts as a pattern to be candidate for correspondence
and coordination. Without an answer to these issues, researchers cannot properly judge
empirical evidence for or against this claim, leaving much of the debate in a stalemate.
Before closing, I would like to sketch some suggestions about how to understand
VT in a scientifically fruitful way. It must be clear in advance however that a detailed
discussion of the consequences of these desiderata requires more space than what is left
here, but I shall nevertheless attempt to leave some important lessons on the table from
which a science of emotion can benefit.
First, it is central to offering an account of variability that researchers become
explicit about what evidence they consider relevant to split or lump together emotion
categories. This includes questions such as whether neural or physiological differences
suffice or not to split an emotion category, or whether behavioral homogeneity is
enough to consider an emotion as a whole. Since different theories have different
commitments in this regard, it is important to at least be explicit about them so that
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researchers can evaluate variability in each theories’ terms and detect when a theory
fails to meet their empirical predictions while doing justice to their claims.
One important application of this consideration lies in the discussions between psy-
chological constructionists and basic emotion theorists. Psychological constructionists
have argued heavily for the claim that empirical evidence supports variability, while (at
least some) basic emotion theorists have denied this claim. To decide these issues, it is
vital that each theory makes clear on which conditions they hold variability to be true. As
the current debate stands, it is unclear for example whether psychological constructionism
is compatible with locationism (emotions could be potentially constructed even if they are
constructed in specific regions in the brain, even though constructionists often reject
locationism) or whether basic emotion theory is incompatible with variability (but see
Scarantino (2012b, 2015) for arguments to the contrary). In any case, theories must make
their commitments explicit in order to discuss empirical evidence on the same ground,
otherwise risking talking about different claims altogether.
Second, as I have hinted at above, researchers should focus on neural, physiological,
and behavioral evidence. This is because, on the one hand, it is unclear whether
evidence on the universality of expressions can inform questions about variability,
and if it can, it seems that it is reducible to behavioral patterns. On the other hand,
regarding phenomenological patterns, a similar argument obtains, i.e., either they do
not inform the issue of variability or they are arguably reducible to patterns of behavior.
By focusing on certain kinds of patterns, researchers can have a better grasp on
which kinds of evidence are relevant to decide variability and its consequences. This
would not only inform our consideration of previous evidence, such as leading to a
reconsideration of the role of the universality of emotional expression and its alleged
correspondence with specific physiological patterns, but would also serve to delimit
and specify which future studies will be relevant to decide fundamental claims about
the nature of emotions. In particular, I suspect that focusing on these three kinds of
patterns will lead to a more detailed discussion on the merits and disadvantages of
MVPA for the individuation of neural patterns, a clearer idea of what to expect at the
physiological level, and more conceptual clarity on what behavioral patterns entail for
the distinction between different emotion categories. In all three cases, we would have a
better grasp of which empirical evidence is relevant and where to look for it.
This leads directly to a third desideratum: it is crucial that researchers agree on the criteria
to individuate different patterns. This involves agreeing on the neural ontology of emotions
(anatomical, homological, or functional locationism), the types of correlations that support a
physiological pattern, and how behavioral patterns can be individuated without circularity
and triviality.Without these criteria, researchers will keep on talking past each other without
a consensus on how to evaluate the empirical evidence at hand. While this is difficult in
practice, it is paramount that researchers pay attention to these debates in order to better
understand the import of different kinds of empirical evidence. For example, should we find
no specific region in the brain for a given emotion category (as constructionists often claim
to have found), does that mean that there is no useful neural description that we can map
onto that category? Would that also apply for the alleged lack of consistency at the
physiological level? And what do results in behavioral psychology offer to the question
of what emotions are? These questions, I take it, must be addressed in order for empirical
evidence to come to have bearing on the more general questions emotion theorists are after.
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Lastly, it is worth asking: if variability were truly the norm, by what criteria do we
manage to apply emotion categories in everyday life? In other words, is there some
relation between folk emotion categories and VT? At this point, it is difficult to say
given the difficulties in understanding what exactly VT claims as an empirical hypoth-
esis. Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out that we may still apply folk emotion
categories even if VT turns out to be true. This would suggest some unity at a higher
level of abstraction than what a purely physicalist framework—a framework that has
been assumed for the most part in the debate so far—can offer. In this direction,
researchers should consider the possibility that the unity of emotion categories lies, not
in specific correspondences, but in more complex, multiply realizable systems.
Hopefully, these desiderata can help make clear what the points of debate are and
how different theories relate to empirical findings. Even though many of these discus-
sions require a deeper treatment than I was able to offer here, I expect to have raised
questions that can shed light on ways to move the debate forward. If I am correct about
these observations, then we can expect a fruitful theoretical discussion and an interest-
ing reinterpretation of empirical evidence; if not, then the arguments against it will also
bring to the surface a number of commitments that are at play in the debate.
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